well as common ancestry, culture, history, and beliefs. The analysis of the ethnic dimension focuses on 'ethnic' causes, 'ethnic' narratives, and 'ethnic' violence. Here it is argued that the Ambon and Poso conflicts were no less ethnic than the Sambas conflict as they shared many of the same ethnic causes and, the ethnic narratives that were advanced, were similar. This article then looks at the conflict narratives, exploring why the religious narrative dominated in Ambon and Poso despite the involvement of different ethnic groups and why the ethnic narrative dominated in Sambas despite the involvement of different religions. It also reflects on why the ethnic conflict narrative was advanced mainly by non-Muslims, and whether the narrative framing had direct implications for the trajectory of the conflicts. Here two arguments are advanced: First, that the conflict narrative in Ambon and Poso was religious because it reflected the broader national religious tensions resulting from the resurgence of Islam in Indonesia since the 1990s while the ethnic narrative dominated in Sambas because it was the latest round of periodic anti-Madurese violence since the 1960s. The latter was 'defined' as 'ethnic' at a time when Islam was in a weakened position in Indonesia with the defeat of the Darul Islam rebellions in 1962. Second, that the narratives were also framed and re-framed strategically, the latter accounting for the shift from an ethnic narrative to a religious one among Christians in Ambon and Poso. They thus influenced the trajectory of the conflict and were influenced by it.
Ethnic causes
When looking at the causes of the Ambon, Poso and Sambas conflicts it is impossible to overlook the changes in the ethnic composition of these three areas in the decades preceding the eruption of the violence. The in-migration of other ethnic groups changed the demographic balance leading to the marginalisation of the indigenous, resulted in the loss of ancestral land, and eroded local customary adat structures. All of these thus became 'ethnic' causes of conflict.
In-migration and the marginalisation of the indigenous
Driven by the need to address overpopulation on Java, Bali and Lombok the central government pursued a transmigration policy to redistribute people from high population density areas to those with smaller populations (Hardjono 1977; Fasbender and Erbe 1990) .
The resettlement of transmigrants on the outer islands, however, was problematic as both the colonial and post-colonial government had fostered the sense that people of different regions were of different ethnicity. Indeed, ethnicity and locality overlapped to such an extent that they were assumed to be a single concept, what Tom Boellstorff refers to as ethnolocality (Boellstorff 2002, 25) . Transmigrants were thus not seen by locals as fellow Indonesians but as 'others' and as their numbers grew, so did the competition and fears that locals were losing out.
Between 1975 and 1990 Central Sulawesi saw the influx of 181,696 transmigrants, Maluku the influx of 139,465 transmigrants, and West Kalimantan the influx of 102,520
transmigrants (Bertrand 2004, 93) . This transmigration was perceived by locals as a fundamentally unequal process in which local land was appropriated by the state and given to migrants along with government assistance in the form of tools and seed. In Maluku, this resulted in the transmigrant farmers being seen as more competitive than locals who were not familiar with 'modern' agriculture.
1 In West Kalimantan, it was believed to have led to the loss of land as well as jobs and when the local Dayak complained, they were ignored or simply labelled as 'lazy'.
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The transmigrants, who were mainly Javanese farmers, were followed by significant numbers of 'spontaneous' migrants of other ethnicities. The latter were not organised by the state but went on their own buoyed by the general pro-migration mood as well as the increased access to remote areas as new roads were constructed in accordance with the New Order's developmentalist policies. The construction projects themselves attracted large numbers of spontaneous migrants who worked on the sites. The completed roads brought further migrants, small traders lured by the possibility of new markets.
In Central Sulawesi the migrants flocked to the extractive industries such as ebony as well cash crops, soon dominating the clove, cacao, coffee and copra trade. They also owned the majority of small shops (HRW 2002, 6) . Even the market in the Protestant highland stronghold of Tentena became dominated by Bugis, Gorontalo and Arab descent migrants with the effect that pork could no longer be purchased as the traders were Muslim (Damanik 2003, 44) . By the 1990s the key sectors of the economy were dominated by migrants because local Christians were more interested in civil service positions while the migrants were able to tap into existing ethnic trade networks.
In West Kalimantan the spontaneous migrants were Bugis and Madurese. The latter became a particular thorn in the eyes of local Dayaks and Malays as they had followed
Madurese transmigrants (DR, 29 March -3 April 1999) . This made them the largest migrant community. Moreover, according to locals, the Madurese, unlike the Bugis, did not integrate with society. 3 And in terms of employment they seemed to be everywhere. They worked as port labourers, on construction sites, on plantations, in coffee shops, and commerce. Their employment by logging companies and illegal loggers as well as construction companies that 'opened the jungle' by building roads put them on a collision course with the rural Dayaks who sought to protect their resources. In the cities the Madurese were particularly numerous in the transport sector. In Pontianak they took over the becaks (pedicabs) from the Chinese 4 while in Sambas they pushed out the Malays. They also competed with Malay small traders and peddlers.
In Maluku the majority of spontaneous migrants were Bugis, Butonese and Makassar -referred to as BBM. The BBM initially filled the emerging gaps in the economy as Ambonese Muslims climbed up the educational ladder. Butonese migrants in the 1960s worked as labourers in the harbour. 5 By the 1980s, they had also moved into fishing. Bugis migrants worked as becak drivers and soon dominated local transport. By 1996, locals found that they were losing in the competition with the outsiders and started blaming the migrants for problems ranging from the pollution of Ambon's harbor, 6 to rising Muslim Ambonese unemployment, and declining economic opportunities for Christian Ambonese (Bertrand 2002, 73) .
The loss of ancestral lands
In-migration also resulted in the loss of tanah adat (customary/ancestral lands) in West
Kalimantan and Central Sulawesi. The encroachment by the state on ancestral lands began with the Basic Agrarian Law 5/1960 which stated that customary land tenure only applied to the extent that it did not conflict with 'national interests' (ICG 2001, 15 From the 1990s onwards, spontaneous migrants also started to push into the interior of Poso district searching for land especially for cacao plantations (Damanik 2003, 44) . This rose dramatically after the 1997 Asian financial crisis when cacao became the '"hot" export crop because it was pegged to the US dollar' (Aragon 2001, 56) . Some migrants did not even bother to purchase land but simply entered Pamona ancestral forests with chainsaws and cut down the trees to clear fields for cacao and other cash crops (HRW 2002, 6) .
In West Kalimantan it was Dayak adat land that was appropriated by Jakarta for transmigration, the logging industry, and plantations. Most Dayak land was communally owned but this was not recognised by the central government as 'there are no formal land titles'. 7 In many cases this meant the eviction and destruction of whole villages without compensation by the state (Dove 1997, 1) . They were then relocated to new 'modern' villages with 'modern' houses, often forcibly by the army and police. 8 It is estimated that as many as 2.5 million Dayaks were displaced throughout Kalimantan.
The land taken by the state was then given as concessions to logging and plantation companies. Between 1968 and 1973 timber production in West Kalimantan increased 25-fold from 127,894 to 3.3 million cubic meters (Davidson, n.d., 4) . In the 1980s around 3 million hectares were given for large-scale, mainly palm oil plantations (Bappeda 1993, 11, table 1.5) . This land, too, was taken with little or no compensation or consultation. 9 The destruction of the forest by logging and plantation companies was further compounded by illegal logging, usually facilitated by corrupt local officials and protected by elements in the security forces.
Like the Pamona, Mori and Lore in Central Sulawesi, the Dayak protested their dispossession only to be accused of 'obstructing national development ' (ICG 2001, 20) and to be labelled as 'primitives' (Djuweng 1997, 25-26) . At the same time, whenever a Dayak felled a tree to meet household needs, he was treated like a criminal (The Jakarta Post, April 20, 1999) . Not surprisingly 'the frustration of the Dayaks seeing the greedy exploitation of Kalimantan, the felling of trees and damage to the environment and all the wealth that was enjoyed in Jakarta' 10 became one of the key reasons for the periodic Dayak violence.
Conflict erupted with those migrants who were seen as collaborators in this process of dispossession: the Madurese. They were seen as being at 'the forefront of the land grab' from 1967 onwards.
11 They were also working for the construction companies that were clearing the land and building roads into West Kalimantan's interior. And when the logging companies arrived, it was the Madurese who cut down the trees the Dayaks saw as theirs.
The loss of adat land had a traumatic impact on the indigenous communities in both
Central Sulawesi and West Kalimantan as land was intrinsically connected to the ancestral religions. In these animistic belief systems soil, trees, plants, stones, and rivers were imbued with spirits living in harmony with man, constituting a 'greater whole.' Nature and resources
were not economic assets and not subordinate to man but existed in harmony with him (Djuweng 1997, 12-14) . This interconnectedness with the land had not changed when the Pamona, Lore, and Mori had become Protestants or when the Dayak had become Catholics.
The land was still considered sacral. It was the 'proof of the existence of their ancestors before them, a base on which to continue life at present, a future heirloom to be handed down to the next generation' (Djuweng 1998, 6) .
Undermining and violating local adat
While the loss of ancestral lands was central only to the growing ethnic tensions in West Kalimantan and Central Sulawesi, the 'loss' of adat or violation of adat played a key role in the eruption of violence in all three conflicts. During the New Order local adat was systematically undermined by the state's nation-building efforts through centralisation, 'uniformisation', and bringing all constituent elements of the Indonesian nation in line with the New Order's national imaginary, which had a Javanese and 'modern' face. The policy which had the greatest impact on local adat was Law 5/1979 on Village Governance. Its purpose was to standardise village government across the archipelago as well as to replace 'outdated' traditional village systems with a 'modern' one. This was detrimental for the vast majority of communities in Indonesia as this legislation was not ethnically neutral; it imposed the Javanese system, as the chosen model, on non-Javanese areas.
The Law on Village Governance removed power from customary leaders as well as customary councils of elders and placed it in the hands of the national civil service, increasing political control by outsiders and engineering new socio-political hierarchies. In West Kalimantan the communally elected Dayak kepala adat (customary leader) was replaced by a politically elected kepala desa (village head). The requirement of a high school degree for candidates for village head, excluded most customary leaders from running (ICG 2001, 18-19) . However, it was not just village governance that was standardised but also village size. This led to the merger of distinct communities with 'the component parts of the new villages … sometimes as much as eight or ten kilometres apart with the result that some villagers did not even know the village head' (Ibid).
In Ambon, the impact of these administrative reforms was fourfold: First, the traditional raja negeri (village head) had to change his title to kepala desa, trading a title legitimated by adat for a purely administrative one. Second, under the new system, all adults living in a village had the same right to become kepala desa unlike the raja which had been an 'ascribed status' (Pariella 1996, 116) . Third, the assault on adat weakened Ambon's pela alliance system which tied together two or three different villages, irrespective of religion, into a brotherhood (Bartels 2010, 219) . Pela relations created 'cultural harmony' which
counter-balanced what one Ambonese referred to as 'the silent religious conflict since the arrival of Christianity during the colonial era.' 12 And fourth, the introduction of the elected kepala desa resulted in the loss of moral authority as most kepala desa were associated with the increasingly corrupt governing Golkar party. This, in turn, meant that when the conflict erupted in January 1999, local leaders had no capacity to calm the situation.
The systematic erosion of local adat by the New Order regime was exacerbated by the in-migration into Ambon, Poso and West Kalimantan of other ethnic groups with their own, different customs. This caused tensions when local adat was disrespected. As Albert Tumimor, the grandson of the raja of Poso, recalled his grandfather saying: 'I did not invite you [the migrants]. But if you want to stay here, respect our traditions.' Tumimor then remarked that the migrants 'did not behave like guests or what you would expect from newcomers. When they were here for a while and had become rich, they started to suppress the indigenous'. 13 Many locals also felt that there was a tendency for migrants to feel more cultured than the locals and to behave arrogantly (Damanik 2003, 43) .
While disputes over land in the rural areas gave rise to 'chronic' conflict dynamics between locals and both transmigrants and spontaneous migrants, it was in the urban areas like Ambon city, Poso city and Sambas town where the incendiary mix of a high concentration of spontaneous migrants, high population density, high unemployment, and a high proportion of male youths created the 'acute' conflict that erupted in December 1998
and January 1999. Here customs from the various migrant communities collided with local adat structures and the close proximity of indigenous and migrants combined with the political, economic and social competition heightened ethnic identity and 'sharpened' indigenous responses to transgressions of local adat by outsiders. At the same time traditional structures as a whole, both migrant and indigenous, were challenged by modernity and youthful rebellion which resulted in the disrespect of any adat or indeed authority.
As can be seen from this discussion, the Ambon, Poso and Sambas conflicts clearly drew upon 'ethnic' grievances resulting from in-migration, the loss of ancestral land, and the erosion or violation of local adat in the years preceding the violence. The cumulative effect was a direct cultural or 'ethnic' threat which was a key cause of all three conflicts.
Ethnic Violence
To assess the extent to which the violence in Ambon, Poso, and Sambas was 'ethnic' it is useful to look at the targets, the motivation, and the modus operandi. In all three conflicts there was ethnic targeting. In the Ambon conflict this was most visible during the first few and those migrants who did not manage to flee were hacked to death. 16 Over the next couple of days the Pamona fighters proceeded to round up those who had fled into the nearby forest.
One Pamona youth, who had participated in the attack 'returned to Tentena with 50 identity cards which he had taken off the people he had killed' 17 -they were all migrants.
The motivations for targeting the migrants in the Poso conflict were similar to those in the Ambon conflict. 'They targeted the Bugis, Gorontalo and Javanese because they were an economic threat … and because they were aggressive.' 18 The Pamona retribution in the third phase of the conflict, moreover, was explained as a response to the fact that virtually all of the destruction in the first and second phases was of Pamona property. It was also a response The ethnic narrative appealed for three key reasons: First, it more accurately reflected the multiple grievances and complex causes of the conflicts rather than reducing them to religion as the sole factor. Second, it allowed the Christians to frame their fears with respect to the Islamic resurgence in a way they believed would not upset indigenous Muslims with whom relations were largely harmonious, aided by the fact that they had a shared local history, culture, and even ancestors. Third, it allowed them to put forward their grievances in a 'neutral' way in country in which the Islamisation had considerably narrowed the space for
Christians to advance a 'religious narrative' as many Muslims associated Christians not just with colonial history but the more recent appearance of aggressive evangelical missionaries and the policies of 'western imperialists'. It has been argued here that at a broader level, the religious narrative dominated in the Ambon and Poso conflicts because it reflected the religious tensions nationally resulting from the resurgence of Islam in Indonesia since the 1990s while the ethnic narrative dominated in the Sambas conflict because there was an extant historical narrative, which was ethnic as it predated this resurgence.
Muslims in Ambon and
The ethnic narrative was retained in Sambas because the first phase of the violence pitted Muslims of different ethnicity against each other which precluded a religious narrative.
The entry of the non-Muslim Dayaks into the conflict in the second phase did not result in a narrative shift because the political, economic and social interests of the Malays lay in emphasizing shared indigeneity with the Dayaks rather than shared religion with the Madurese. Moreover, the fact that the conflict overall was quite brief, when compared with the Ambon and Poso conflicts, limited the scope for an 'evolving' narrative. And finally, the episodic nature of the broader anti-Madurese violence in West Kalimantan not only reinforced the existing narrative but self-validated it.
In comparison, the Ambon and Poso conflicts were of recent nature, following several decades of peaceful co-existence between local Christians and Muslims. They erupted at a time of Islamic resurgence leading local Muslims to almost automatically adopt a religious narrative as it reflected their core identity at the time and resonated with broader Muslim grievances resulting from the first two decades of the New Order. Local Christians advanced an ethnic or mixed narrative which then shifted to a religious narrative as the conflicts progressed over years. This shift reflected a change in the conflict trajectory with the arrival of the mujahedin and particularly the arrival of Laskar Jihad, which resulted in the Christians seeing themselves as victims of religious aggression but also in a strategic reframing of the narrative in order to appeal to the international community.
More generally, the comparison of these three conflicts has shown the impact and importance of national and even global dynamics on the shaping of local conflict narratives as well as why some narratives have historical durability. It has also illustrated that narratives, particularly in protracted, on-going conflicts, are often reframed to reflect developments on the ground or strategic needs, resulting in the emergence of a particular narrative even when a different one was equally valid. And finally, it has been demonstrated that the competing interests of the actors result in a contest of narrative framing. It is this area which has considerable scope for further research by delving more deeply into the question of which actors get to frame or reframe the narrative, which ones are excluded from the process, and why.
